|
BMP5 checklist for TEAM LEADER
|
|
General
|
|
Is it the intention to sail through the HRA at maximum speed?
• What is the maximum speed of the ship?
• What is the cruising speed of the ship?
|
|
|
|
Will the ship be sailing alone, in convoy or in group transit?
|
|
|
|
Is it the intention not to carry out work on deck during the passage through the high-risk
area?
|
|
|
|
Crew preparation
|
| |
|
Notes
|
|
Has the crew received a briefing from the TL/PCASP team
|
|
A briefing in which they were made aware of:
• The danger of piracy
• The latest intelligence (threat assessment)
• What to do in an emergency
• How access to the accommodation block and engine rooms will be controlled/regulated
during the passage through the HRA.
Ref BMP 5 p. 9 and p. 16
|
|
Has the crew been trained in the actions to be taken if there is a risk of attack
by pirates?
|
|
• First actions of bridge team and PCASP on suspicious approach
• Alerting the crew
• First actions to be taken by the crew
• Retreat to citadel when ordered to do so
• What to do when the ‘all clear’ is given
Ref BMP 5 p. 9
|
|
Manoeuvring: has the bridge team practised taking the first evasive manoeuvres after
observing a suspicious vessel?
|
|
|
| |
|
Mandatory measures upon entry into high-risk area
|
|
Binoculars available
|
|
|
|
Search lights available
|
|
|
|
Concertina razor wire available and in place
|
|
|
|
Safe muster point or safe room designated for ship’s crew
|
|
|
|
Crew prepared by means of anti-piracy exercises
|
|
|
|
Trained crew members deployed to one or more lookout posts
|
|
|
|
Water or foam sprayers mounted on the deck near potential boarding points
|
|
|
|
Doors and hatches giving access to the bridge, the crew and passenger quarters and
the engine rooms have been locked
|
|
|
|
Large windows and portholes reinforced
|
|
|
|
Ship equipment and machinery protected against third-party use
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Other possible measures
|
| |
|
|
|
Place dummies (mannequins) on the bridge wings and/or other places to give the impression
that a good lookout is being kept;
|
|
|
|
Avoid drifting and slow speeds, and do not anchor in the HRA;
|
|
|
|
• Anti-RPG fencing along the bridge wings to provide protection against Rocket-Propelled
Grenades (RPGs);
• Sandbags or water-filled oil drums beside openings along the bridge wings, behind
which PCASP and bridge crew can take shelter;
• Steel plates that can be quickly mounted on a number of bridge windows on both port
and starboard sides in the event of an attack or suspicious approach;
• Anti-blast lamination on bridge windows to protect against flying glass caused by
bullet impacts.
|
|
|
|
Other (non-physical) protective measures that may be considered (not mandatory):
• If present, CCTV cameras should be positioned to provide a view of areas that are
vulnerable to pirates, such as the quarterdeck and the lowest deck (wind hole);
• If present, CCTV cameras could be positioned in such a way, potentially with a searchlight
alongside, that the surroundings (the water) at the rear of the ship (behind the railing)
can be monitored from the bridge;
• The ability to centrally switch off lighting in the accommodation block to disorient
pirates once inside;
• Displaying warning signs on the outside of the ship in English and/or Somali and/or
drawings indicating that the ship is protected by armed guards.
Ref BMP-5 p. 18
|
|
|
|
Communication and means of communication
|
|
Do all means of communication work?
• VHF from the bridge
• VHF from the citadel
• INMARSAT from the bridge and/or cabin
• INMARSAT from the citadel
• Internal ship communication devices (telephones/two-way radios);
• Has the SSAS been tested?
• Is the Automatic Identification System enabled?
• Are the emergency contact lists up to date and have they been posted at all locations
from which external calls can be made, including the citadel?
Ref: BMP p. 9
|
|
|
|
In terms of communication, will the following actions be taken upon entry to the HRA?
• Minimise use of VHF;
• If VHF is used, only respond to ‘legitimate’ or known contacts.
Ref: BMP5 – p. 10
|
|
VHF could give away the ship’s position. Preferably use email and INMARSAT instead.
There have been cases where people have used VHF to pretend to be someone other than
who they really are.
|
|
Have UKMTO and MSCHOA been informed of the ship’s sailing plans through the Voluntary
Reporting Scheme? Have the following reports been made, or will they be made?
• Initial report (upon entering VRA);
• Daily (noon) report;
• Final report upon leaving VRA;
• Reporting of irregular or suspicious ship movements.
Ref: BMP5 p. 21
|
|
|
|
Ship’s resources
|
|
Optical resources:
• Are Night Viewing Optics and/or Thermal Imagers (TIs) present and working and can
the crew access them during the hours of darkness?
|
|
|
|
Radar. Does the ship have:
• Properly functioning navigation radar for all-round observation?
• Fence radar (stern radar) covering the area behind the funnel?
|
|
|
|
Alarm signals: Is the alarm that sounds in case of a suspicious ship or an attack
such that the ship immediately knows that it is a possible attack and the alarm is
not confused with (for example) a fire alarm?
Ref BMP-5 p. 9
|
|
|
|
Securing the crew – muster, citadel
|
|
Citadel. Is a citadel present or designated?
Does the citadel meet the following conditions?
• VHF and/or INMARSAT connection with the outside world (see also Section 5);
• Sufficient water and food for the entire crew for a long period of time;
• Sanitary facilities;
• Team medic designated?
• Sufficient medical resources to treat even serious injuries;
• Ability to steer the ship;
• Have the crew practised evacuating to the citadel?
Ref BMP-5 p. 17
|
|
|
|
Other observations
|
| |
|
|
|
I have completed this form correctly to the best of my knowledge.
|
|
Signature
|
|
|
|
Team leader’s name
|
|
|
|
Company
|
|
|
